

THE NATURE AND HISTORICAL PARADOXES OF FREEDOM

A comparative study on Marx/Engels and liberal/neoliberal writers
in their relation to classical liberalism

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Freedom is a powerful idea and a driving concept. Even in everyday life, though –it would probably be not wrong to say- the majority of people do not have any clear concept of freedom they nonetheless use a vague notion of freedom to guide their everyday actions. Thus, it seems to be justified to claim that freedom was and is the main ideal force that shook, changed, shaped and re-shaped the world throughout the history. It worked and works often behind the immediately visible scenes without being consciously articulated. Only in modern times it appears consciously in the foreground or immediately visible on the scene of the world-theatre that is called the world-history. It is one of Hegel’s historical achievements (departing critically from Rousseau’s observation on perfectibility²) to point out that the ‘leading principle’ of history is freedom³ – what Smith explores in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* and works out into a concept in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *Wealth of Nations*. Combined with equality and fraternity, it gave rise

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² In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau investigates the question of what the specific difference between animals and humans as free agencies is. He excludes understanding as constituting element of the difference as he thinks that animals have a capacity of thinking as well. He suggests: ‘Nature lays her commands on every animal, and the brute obeys her voice.’ Rousseau continues: ‘Man receives the same impulsion’. In that respect Rousseau does not see any difference between animals and humans. However, he continues and makes an observation which is confirmed by contemporary scientific research findings: ‘but’, he says, humans know themselves at the same time at ‘liberty to acquiesce or resist: and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his soul is displayed.’ What Rousseau says comes to this: animals adopt themselves to their natural circumstances, whereas humans change them at the same time by their labour. Rousseau observes further and sees ‘another very specific quality which distinguishes them, and which will admit of no dispute. This is the *faculty of self-improvement*, which, by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual’ (J.-J. Rousseau, *A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, in *The Social Contract and Discourses*, p. 170 – italics added).

³ Hegel’s critique concerns not so much Rousseau’s principle of perfectibility (‘faculty of self-improvement’) as such, but its abstractness. (Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, eds. E. Moldauer and K.M. Michel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1992, vol. 12, pp. 76-80).

to series of revolutions in Europe and eventually in the world since the mid of the 17th century, and this is the condition that humanity still seeks to establish.

As well as subordinated and oppressed, and ruling classes, colonised and suppressed people, and imperialist states referred and refer to the concept of freedom either to justify their fight for emancipation and self determination or defend their dominating (hegemonic) socio-economic and political positions. This shows that the concept of liberty can be used to improve human conditions, but it can also be *misused* to justify privileges. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is a very hot-combated concept. All social forces which -in one way or another- occupy a place in the scene of the world history use all means available to claim the concept of freedom for their causes and try to determine its content for their often contradictory aims. It seems therefore of crucial importance to bring some clarification into the concept of freedom that is fought for.

In contemporary debates in almost all social sciences and philosophy, and even in everyday life and everyday politics it continues to be one of the hot-combated core concepts, if not that concept as such that is fought for. Marxist scholars make use of the concept of freedom when they call for fundamental social and political changes as explored within the framework of the concept of (human) emancipation - a concept to which's re-establishment and further-development among contemporary Marxist scholars Domenico Losurdo contributed (to say the least) a lot. By contrast, paradoxical enough, neo-liberals and conservatives, too, use the concept of freedom to justify their social and political proposals which are generally identified -as we think apply so- as social-Darwinist. They seem to mean by freedom coercion rather than emancipation as it was defined originally in the classical period of European philosophy. Therefore, it is not wrong to draw here a bold line between two camps in the debate on freedom: between those scholars who talk of liberty but mean by that the concept of coercion (negative freedom: *freedom from*) and those scholars who further develop the concept of freedom and mean by that *human emancipation* (positive freedom: *freedom to*). Despite all the differences within each camp this may be pointed to as the great demarcation line that draws the boundaries of the two fronts in the debate on the concept of freedom. However, on the front of those who seeks human emancipation, despite all the declarations in the last two decades and more that he was *dead*, Marx continues to be the point of attraction as he seems to have developed the most comprehensive concept of freedom in modern times.

The fact that neoliberal writers and Marxist scholars make use of the concept of freedom at the same time is therefore an obvious paradox as well as an intriguing commonness. This provokes for further investigation and requires conceptual qualification. The aim of this paper is to address this paradox. In doing so, we wish to contribute to the clarification of the fronts. To do this we

explore the Marxist and neoliberal (and conservative) concepts of freedom in relation to one another. We want to show what their differences are and in what way they are distinct from one another. We will also be looking at the theorising on freedom in classical European philosophy to see in what way these two camps of scholars deviate or profit from this rich tradition. This may enable us to have a better grasp of the nature of the concept of freedom in general, and to have a better understanding of the concepts of freedom that is employed in Marxist as well as in contemporary neoliberal (and conservative) thoughts respectively in particular.

A METHODOLOGICAL CRITERION: ‘FREEDOM REMAINS FREEDOM’

In this section, before we go over to investigate the nature of the concept of freedom and indicate explicitly to the paradox we referred to above that neoliberals and Marxist scholars make use of the concept of freedom at the same time to justify their positions respectively, we would like to formulate a methodological principle. This will enable to judge of the theories of freedom we are going to present below.

We would like to start our methodological considerations with a preliminary remark. It concerns the usage of the terms of freedom and liberty. In English speaking world some scholars prefer to make a distinction between freedom and liberty and others use both liberty and freedom synonymously in the same sense. For the sake of space, without going into these sophisticated debates, in this paper we prefer to follow the latter and use both terms in the same sense.

In everyday language freedom is supposed to mean the absence of interference and impediment. This ordinary definition of freedom may be found in any ordinary dictionary or encyclopaedia of English language, philosophy and politics, and other cognate areas. Or, as more emphasised in German ones, it means ‘independence and absence of force’ or ‘coercion’. This and similar definitions may also be found in its various forms in any other language dictionary. This is a negative meaning of the word and means *freedom from* (*negative* liberty) rather than *freedom to* (*positive* liberty). But before it comes to be replaced for the above-described *negative* meaning of the word, in Indo-European languages, it seems to have had a positive or at least neutral meaning and seems to have meant ‘to love’, ‘to preserve’ or ‘to protect’ and ‘to treat *s.th.* with care’.

In Turkish language, however, besides the negative meaning as in European languages there is a further aspect of the term of which we think worth emphasising because it helps in a certain sense to have broader view than the above-mentioned spontaneous or non-reflected everyday understanding of freedom. In modern Turkish language freedom (*özgürlük*) means also natural and powerful *I* or the *self*. The Turkish word for free is ‘özgür’. It is a combination of two words: ‘öz’ and ‘gür’, öz-gür. The word ‘öz’ means the *essence* or the *nature* of something, and of *I* or of

the *self*; and 'gür' among other things means 'natural' and 'strong' or 'powerful'. So taken together *özgür* means the *powerful self* and implies that individuals can only be free if they are powerful in and against the society as a whole. How and why this positive meaning is important for further consideration about freedom will be shown further down. We will also be indicating why this meaning of the word does not capture the whole scope of the concept of freedom.

Already the admittedly very short glance over the meaning of the word in English and German languages points to some (compared with its original meaning in Indo-European languages) essential changes in human beings' relationship to one another. We think that this change in the meaning of the word has to do with the division of human beings into various hierarchically situated groups, casts and eventually social classes (social division of labour). It is therefore not wrong to assume that (historically speaking) this essential change in social relations was also the source of the demand for social and eventually political freedom. On the other hand, if we focus on the contemporary meaning of freedom, it reveals that it reflects (beside this change in human relations) also a kind of spontaneous meaning that hardly grasps the nature of human relations. Human beings (as everything in nature and society as 'second nature') are not *in*-dependent but *inter*-dependent. This originates in the nature of social relations that everybody is dependent on one another. Otherwise, if that were not so, no one of us could hardly fulfil his/her life projects. To define freedom as 'independence' (which may be seen as a modern version of Aristotle's concept of autarky) expresses therefore a kind of alienation of human beings in their relations to one another and in their relation to society as a whole. It implies that freedom is only possible against others we live with and against the society we live in. The assessment that human beings are *inter*-dependent in their relations to one another suggests that freedom is only possible through and with others. In other words, the freedom of the one requires the freedom of other. The mutuality makes up the core of the concept of interdependence as mutual freedom. The interdependence concept of freedom suggests further that individuals can only be free if the society as a whole is free. The difference between these two approaches to the assessment of human relations is of huge importance for further consideration about freedom as it will be clearer further below.⁴

⁴ However, already at this stage of the development of our arguments it would not be inappropriate to point out that it is the concept of freedom as 'independence' that leads to the misuse of the concept of freedom, which Hegel refers to and as Domenico Losurdo points out: 'The philosopher [Hegel] ... has already differentiated between formal freedom and real freedom ... , he has already clarified that the term "freedom" can also be an ideological blinding work to beautify or to conceal mostly short-sighted and backward "private interests".' (D. Losurdo, *Hegel und die Freiheit der Modernen*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. et al, 2000, pp. 98/99.) However, from another point of view as Hegel points out, if the concept of equality is not accompanied by the concept of freedom it may lead to the misuse of the concept of equality. He indicates to this in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* in relation to Chinese political system, in the context that in China there is no constitution. The entire system is based on the principle of equality. According to Hegel this leads to political despotism because the concept of equality is not led

In this paper, we are going to claim that liberals (and conservatives) take over the above-described spontaneous, that is, non-reflected or unconscious meaning of everyday life on freedom and based on this they draw a concept of freedom that may more properly be called a concept of domination and coercion rather than freedom, even though they claim that they define freedom of thought or opinion, freedom of action as absence of coercion.⁵ As opposed to this view, we suggest that Marx and Engels reflect upon this spontaneous meaning critically because they reflect upon the concept of freedom historically and analyse on that basis the social relations in capitalist society critically. This critical approach, we suggest further, grasps the true meaning of human relations in their entirety and therefore also the true nature of the concept of freedom.

Among liberal (and conservative) writers on freedom since mid of the 19th century there dominates a dualist and a reductionist approach as Domenico Losurdo shows in his critique of Norberto Bobbio's approach for example.⁶ This reductionist and dualist approach leaves aside the general meaning of the concept of freedom and accounts merely for its various meanings without relating them to one another. Isaiah Berlin's dualist approach to negative and positive freedom and his try to re-define negative freedom in a positive sense shows this clearly. Again Hayek's unconvincing try to re-define freedom as 'absence of coercion' as a necessity of coercion is another form of negative freedom. Berlin and Hayek are most influential examples among contemporary liberal writers. It is important to point out this reductionism and dualism in approaching the concept of freedom, because it reduces the issues relating to the concept of freedom merely to political regulation of state power rather than extinguishing it. This reductionist and dualist approach therefore ends up in the ignoring the more general question about the nature of freedom, namely: 'what freedom *is*'. In fact this reductionism and dualism takes its origins from J. S. Mill's approach to freedom in his still very influential essay *On Liberty* and other essays, in which he tries to justify representative government.⁷ It is probably because of

by liberty (G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen Über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1968, vol. 2-4, pp. 298-300). We point this out, independently from the question whether Hegel's observations on China at that time is valid or not, to stress the point that the principle of liberty, equality and solidarity require one another mutually to avoid any misuse whatsoever, and we think that this ontologically conditioned mutual relationship of these three principles is implied –unlike by the concept of liberty as independence– by the concept of liberty as interdependence.

⁵ Cf. F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, Routledge, London, 1990: we will be dealing with Hayek's conception of freedom as absence of coercion further down.

⁶ Norberto Bobbio's liberal reductionist approach to the concept of freedom is not an isolated one. On the contrary, it is so common among contemporary (neo)liberal and conservative writers. Losurdo's critique of Bobbio's approach exemplifies therefore aptly the limit of contemporary (neo)liberal approaches. (Cf. D. Losurdo, *Hegel und die Freiheit der Modernen*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 2000, pp. 98-129.

⁷ Marx and Engels observe already in the *Manifest of Communist Party* that the modern form of representative government ('Repräsentativstaat') is the form of government that is required by the structure of capitalist society. And indeed only with few exceptions such as Rousseau almost all philosophers of classical European philosophy, whether in contractual tradition or in the tradition of historical school, the former based on a contract the latter

this reductionism and dualism that Mill (despite the promising title and the length of his famous essay) could not define what freedom in fact means as Ted Honderich observes apply.⁸

Despite the fact that liberals (and conservatives) are not able to define what freedom is, they continue to claim the concept as their intellectual and political domain. People like F. A. Hayek, for example, continue to be celebrated as the defender or rather ‘fighter for freedom’. However, with this reductionist and dualist view we may be able to draw various particular concepts of ‘privileges’ (to use Hayek’s own term) but hardly a concept of freedom that relates all various concepts to one another, which may enable to grasp the essential meaning of the concept. That is to say that if we rely on this reductionist and dualist view on freedom we can hardly develop a concept of freedom that may do justice to the concept of freedom as such. In order to be able to theorise about freedom it is absolutely necessary to raise the question about the nature or essence of freedom as it refers back to an essential or, if more preferred, to an ontological question of theoretical philosophy: ‘how is it possible for humanity to be free in the face of a physical ontology?’⁹ This question, however, was one of the main questions which the classical liberal philosophers concerned about and indeed struggled with as may be seen from Kant’s various works, especially from his *Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*.¹⁰ It is important to remind of this question because it overcomes contemporarily dominating short-sighted liberal and conservative views on freedom solely as an individual’s political concern and restate it also regarding humanity’s relationship to nature.

We are bringing this natural aspect into consideration in addition to from a liberal perspective individualised political aspects of freedom not because we are of those ecologically driven writers who talk about all sorts of ecological issues and disregard their close relation to social problems deriving from the private ownership of the means of production (relations of production). On

based on property rights, developed some kind of a theory of a representative government. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1983, vol. 4, p. 464.

⁸ T. Honderich, *Das Elend des Konservatismus*, Rotbuch Verlag, Hamburg, 1994, p. 130.

⁹ As we have indicated above the Turkish word ‘özgürlük’ does not capture the whole meaning of the concept of freedom. The question of freedom or liberty concerns not merely individuals in their relation to other individuals and to society in general but it also concerns humanity’s freedom as such in the face of given natural world. The question of ‘how is it possible for humanity to be free in the face of a physical ontology?’ refers to this last mentioned aspect of the concept of freedom. When the modern Turkish language was developed in the first decades of the 20th century, intellectuals, who were concerned about its development, were very much influenced by the French Revolution of 1789. But by that time the original comprehensive sense of the concept of freedom which is very much present in the works of *Philosophes* such as D’Holbach and Denis Diderot, for example, was already reduced to a mere constitutional issue by writers of the following generations like John Stuart Mill in Britain and James Fitzjames Stephen on the continent, for example. The question of ‘how is it possible for humanity to be free in the face of a physical ontology?’ was eventually discarded. The Turkish intellectuals, who contributed to the development of modern Turkish, seem to have taken over this reduced sense of freedom. However, they seem to have not followed the reductionist writers in their further reduction of the meaning of the concept to a mere negative liberty. This seems to be the reason why both negative and positive freedom are in the meaning of modern Turkish word ‘özgürlük’ kept, but the ontological question left out.

¹⁰ Cf. D. Losurdo, *Immanuel Kant: Freiheit, Recht und Revolution*, Pahl-Rugenstein, Köln, 1987.

the contrary, we think that many at least socially caused ecological issues may be tackled only if they are considered in relation to the problems arising from the mode of capitalist production that reduces or rather turns everything, including nature and animals, into commodities. This comprehensive view of freedom enables to reconsider the question in its all aspects, namely: 'how is human beings' freedom as a species (humanity) possible?'; 'how is individuals' freedom in relation to one another and to the society as a whole possible?'; and 'how is citizens' freedom possible in relation to political institutions?'. It is this comprehensive view of the concept of freedom that we have to have in view when we reconsider freedom today. In other words, we suggest that this broadening view, that is to say that bringing into the consideration the question of freedom in regard to humanity's relationship to nature enables us to explain why and how human relations become relations of social and political domination. What we mean by this will be shown further down.

The comprehensive approach which we put forward here may be reformulated by looking at two passages, the one from Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty* (surprising enough) and the other from Marx's early article *Debates on the Freedom of Press*.

Hayek says:

But while the uses of liberty are many, liberty is one. *Liberties appear only when liberty is lacking*: they are the special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree. The difference between liberty and liberties is that which exists between a condition in which all is permitted that is not prohibited by general rule and one in which all is prohibited that is not explicitly permitted.¹¹

And Marx asserts:

One form of freedom requires another just as one limb of the body does another. Whenever a particular freedom is put in question, freedom in general is put in question. Whenever one form of freedom is rejected, freedom in general is rejected and henceforth can have only a semblance of existence, since the sphere in which absence of freedom is dominant becomes a matter of pure chance. Absence of freedom is the rule and freedom an exception, a fortuitous and arbitrary occurrence. There can, therefore, be nothing wronger than to think that when it is a question of a *particular form* of the existence of freedom, it is a *particular*

¹¹ F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, p. 19 (italics added).

question. It is the general question within a particular sphere. Freedom remains freedom whether it finds expression in printer's ink, in property, in the conscience, or in a political assembly...¹²

The point Hayek and Marx are making seems to be clear here, though it is much better spelt out in what Marx says and despite the fact that Hayek's use of 'general rule' already indicates to his formalism and reductionism. Freedom is not a kind of natural object that may be divided into infinite parts. On the contrary, it is one of those social goods, which appears in all spheres of social life as a whole. For freedom in a particular sphere of social life or of a social group or class as opposed to the rest that is not free may be (if we follow Hayek) qualified as privilege but not as freedom, as Hayek asserts. Freedom in a particular spheres of social life in this sense may be 'special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree' as Hayek asserts (note that Hayek cautiously avoids referring to the concept of social class). They may be the privileges of various groups or social classes in a society, which may enable them to rule over the rest. But they are not freedom.

However, there is a further aspect here. It concerns two mutually required and therefore complementary aspects of the concept of freedom. Freedom is used in various forms such as freedom of conscience, thought and speech, will and action of individuals and collective agents as social groups and classes, and as humanity in relation to natural world. This whole scope of the concept of freedom may be summed up by subsuming them under the terms of *external* and *internal* freedom. These two aspects of the concept of freedom must be taken in their dialectical unity as inseparable and accomplishing aspects of one and the same concept: without the internal freedom there can hardly be an external freedom and without the external freedom, that is, without the freedom of action, there can hardly be an internal freedom. In short, both, external and internal freedom, require one another and they both make up the whole theory of freedom. The freedom of the one requires the freedom of the all. At first sight, at this more general level of abstraction Hayek and Marx seem to agree on this. And any theory of freedom whether it is consistent and whether it comprises the whole scope of the concept can be analysed by looking at how the theory in question deals with these two aspects of freedom.

Hence, we may conclude from the passages quoted above from Hayek and Marx: if we think about freedom in any particular sphere of social life we have to think about it as a 'general question within a particular sphere' as Marx points out, because freedom is one of those goods that occurs in all spheres of social life as a whole, though it may appear in a particular form. If we

¹² K. Marx, *Die Verhandlungen des 6. reihnischen Landtags*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 1, p. 77 (for translation from German we use the translation provided by 'marxist.org', though it may not always be identical).

think about the freedom of press, for example, to refer Marx's main issues in the article quoted, we have to think of freedom not just as freedom of press but we have to take it at the same time as a particular form of the expression of human freedom as such (thought and action) in any particular sphere of social life. Thus, as Marx points out: 'Freedom remains freedom' regardless in which sphere of social life it may appear, and if we follow Hayek's assertion in the above quotation that 'liberty is one' (provided he is consistent enough) we may well assume that he would have subscribed to Marx's assertion in the above-quotation: 'Whenever one form of freedom is rejected, freedom in general is rejected and henceforth can have only a semblance of existence, since the sphere in which absence of freedom is dominant becomes a matter of pure chance.'

We will however see further down whether Hayek and Marx are consistent with their assertions respectively and in what ways and in what senses they differ from one another and which conclusions they arrive at.

NEGATIVE LIBERTY: A POWERLESS CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

As we have pointed out above, contemporarily there prevails a reductionism and dualism among by far the majority of writers on freedom. They reduce the concept of freedom to a mere individualised political issue. All kinds of liberal concepts of freedom developed after 1848/9 revolution and conservative concepts of freedom well before that have one common feature: they are all negative concepts of liberty. But as we will be showing below, it makes only sense of talking about freedom if negative and positive concepts of freedom are taken in their dialectical unity and if negative concept of freedom bears the positive concept of freedom.

Mill's revisionist reductionism

As we have pointed out above, the reductionism and dualism we assert in theorising on freedom since mid of 19th century may be traced back to John Stuart Mill. In his essay *On Liberty*, though the title of his essay promises a comprehensive account of freedom, he already excludes in the first sentence the questions concerning the liberty of will which was put on the agenda forcefully by Kant. Mill defines the subject of his essay as follows:

The subject of this essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social

Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.¹³

Mill's definition of 'social liberty' is somewhat arbitrary. The concept of social liberty implies the concept of human emancipation as shown by Marx. The subject of his essay is rather limited and it may indeed be defined as an essay on civil liberty in the sense of constitutional rights as may be seen from the last part of the passage: 'the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual'. This is the logic of all subsequent liberal writers. By 'society' he seems to mean the state as he uses these two terms as synonyms, which is quite odd because he ignores the fact that there is a separation of the state and society in modern times as Adam Smith shows in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* and Hegel explores in his *Philosophy of Rights*.¹⁴ However, more importantly, by the above-assertion, that is, by excluding the issues about the freedom of the will, Mill discards the whole debate of generations starting with Locke and Leibniz, culminating via Hume and Smith and classical German philosophy in Marx and Engels' work. The following generations of liberal (or rather neo-liberal) and conservative writers followed Mill's path in treating the concept of freedom merely as a negative concept. What was the debate about and why do contemporary liberals/neoliberals and conservatives feel much uneasy about it?

This reductionism and dualism is a world-wide appearance since European revolution of 1848/9 and has to do with what Marx refers to in his 'Afterword' to the second German edition of *Capital*. Anyone who wants to understand what has been happening since then not only in Political Economy but in all social and political sciences and above all in philosophy he/she has to take into account what Marx observes:

The Continental revolution of 1848-9 had its reaction in England. Men who still claimed some scientific standing and aspired to be something more than mere sophists and sycophants of ruling-classes, tried to harmonise the Political Economy of capital with the claims, no longer to be ignored, of the proletariat. Hence a shallow syncretism, of which

¹³ J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, in: Everyman edition of Mill's essays, ed. Geraint Williams, Everyman, London et al, 1993, p. 69.

¹⁴ The observation that there is a distinction between the state and society is implicitly present in almost all theories of the state since New Times. Even in Hobbes' theory of the modern state it is detectable. However, Hegel seems to be first one to have referred to that explicitly and worked it out into a concept. One can even claim that this idea builds the basis of Hegel's whole theory of the modern state in his *Philosophy of Rights*. In the Zusatz to the paragraph 182, for example, he describes the distinction of the society from the state as one of the main characteristics of the modern state. And in the paragraph 258 he explicitly warns that the state should not be mixed up with civil society. (Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, in: Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., eds. E. Moldauer and K.M. Michel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1986, vol. 7, pp. 339 and 399).

John Stuart Mill is the best representative. It is a declaration of bankruptcy by bourgeois economy, an event on which the great Russian scholar and critic, N. Tschernyschewsky, has thrown the light of a master mind in his “Outlines of Political Economy according to Mill.”¹⁵

The bourgeoisie, after having secured and stabilised its political power in the period after the 1848/9 revolutions, is no longer interested in scientific explanation but merely in justification and apology of capitalist relations of production.¹⁶ Mill’s whole work may be seen as an attempt to serve this need.¹⁷ But in the 17th and 18th centuries bourgeoisie was aiming at the seizing of the political power. It had to attack feudal system of privileges with its entire economic basis, social and political institutions, and moral values, i.e., it had to organise gradually a *total attack* against feudal classes and their privileges as long as they did not conform to the needs and subordinated their interests to the interests of bourgeoisie.

Before the bourgeoisie came into power by a series of revolutions in Europe, the church was the most powerful economic and political feudal power. This had to be attacked at its very fundamental ideological basis by bourgeoisie if it wanted to come into power. The whole debate about the liberty or freedom of the will attacks before everything else the theological-ideological basis of the church. For if god was omnipresent and almighty it cannot be the subject to any necessity. The whole debate on liberty of the will however is about the question of whether the will is subject to necessity. If the will (and this means at the same if god) is subject to necessity, then, god cannot be claimed to be omnipresent and almighty and, in turn, this would undermine church’s very ideological basis and question the legitimacy of its power as the allegedly representative of god on the earth. David Hume was probably one of the most explicit philosophers on this. In *A Treatise of Human Nature* he declares:

¹⁵ K. Marx, ‘Afterword to the Second German Edition’, in: *Capital*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970, vol. 1, p. 25 (reproduced after the 1887 English edition by F. Engels). The bankruptcy in bourgeois ‘scientific standing’ Marx refers to is by far not limited to political economy. It may be observed above all in all social, political sciences and theory, and in philosophy. Cf. for a discussion of this issue Marx refers to more in German context: D. Göçmen, ‘Rosa Luxemburg, the Legacy of Classical German Philosophy and the Fundamental Methodological Questions of Social and Political Theory’, in: *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory*, vol. 35, no: 3(2007), pp. 375-390).

¹⁶ Cf. R. Luxemburg, ‘Karl Marx’, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 1/2, pp. 369-377.

¹⁷ Hence his work owes its success not so much to its intellectual depth but to its serving this need of the bourgeoisie after the revolution of 1848/9. Indeed, Mill provided in Britain what Max Weber tried to do in Germany. They both were concerned with the question of how to get rid of the revolutionary bourgeois tradition in Europe after the bourgeoisie seized the power and in doing so they both tried to adjust bourgeois thought to the new situation from a positivist point of view. However, as Mill writes in the second half of the 19th century he recognises the need to reforms to integrate working classes into capitalist system. With Weber bourgeois theorising starts to turn into reactionary one and reaches in Carl Schmitt’s theorising the culmination point from a political point of view - similar to what Heidegger provided from a more philosophical point of view. (Cf. on Heidegger, Schmitt and Weber Domenico Losurdo’s historically speaking unique work: D. Losurdo, *Die Gemeinschaft, der Tod, das Abendland: Heidegger und die Kriegsideologie*, J.B. Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart, 1995.)

There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philosophical debates to endeavour to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads us into absurdities, 'its certainly false; but 'its not certain an opinion is false, because 'its of dangerous consequences. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be foreborn, as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I submit myself frankly to an examination of this kind, and dare venture to affirm, that the doctrine of necessity, according to my explanation of it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to religion and morality.¹⁸

Hume's description reveals the worries the authorities felt in the face not only of his writings. No one believed that his teaching was 'innocent' and 'advantageous' to the established 'religion and morality'. When Mill excludes already in the first sentence of his essay the topical question of the liberty of the will, he does this because he wishes to integrate back the church and religion as one of the carrying pillars into the ideological and institutional system of capitalist social formation. Secondly and more importantly, the debate about the liberty of the will brought to the fore the question of the freedom of action of the agent as such and this led, as it was raised in the context of humanity's relationship to nature, to the question of the freedom or emancipation of labour (as a particular form of action), long before Marx and Engels, as may be studied in works of such philosophers as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and John Millar. In particular Smith's and Ferguson's works are the main sources of Hegel's exploration of the problems concerning the emancipation of the poor and the labouring people. The question of the freedom of action bears the question of the comprehensive emancipation of individuals as individuals and the question of the freedom of labour entails the question of the emancipation of working classes as collective agent. In short, the freedom of action (and labour) refers to the transition from negative freedom to positive freedom, from 'freedom from' to 'freedom to'. Since Mill wants to reformulate the concept of freedom as negative freedom within the framework of the logic of capital, he excludes the question of the freedom of the will, that is, 'freedom to'.

What are the limits of freedom in capitalist society and accordingly in Mill's conception of freedom? In other words, what makes freedom in capitalist society and in Mill's conception of freedom a negative conception of freedom?

¹⁸ D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 409.

After the introduction, Mill opens his essay with a chapter on freedom of thought and discussion. He ardently defends the freedom of thought and opinion. But already in the introduction (first chapter) he points to a political framework as the limit of freedom he sets out to justify. This is the concept of representative government as opposed to the concept of popular government. To understand what the immediate motivations of Mill's are one has to remember that he starts writing his essay in 1854 and publishes in 1859; this is to say that he starts writing his essay together with his other essay *Considerations on Representative Government* approximately 5 years after 1848/9 revolution and publishes 12 years before Paris Commune. Both the 1848/9 revolution and Paris Commune stand in European history for direct (popular) democracy as opposed to representative government. The 1848/9 revolution put on the agenda the call for *social republic* and this replaced the older demand for mere 'republic' of 1789. The Paris Commune of 1871 filled in the content what a social republic might look like and realised it in many ways. In other words, in 1850s the idea of direct or popular democracy was in the air and it was not just an idea but became also a social and political force throughout Europe. Mill's whole consideration or rather worries about 'social tyranny' and 'political despotism', and his conception of freedom as negative freedom are considered to be against this political popular movement as Mill himself indicates.¹⁹

The second limitation to freedom that Mill sets out to justify is primarily of economic nature. That is to say that the institution of private property is the absolute limit to freedom in capitalist society and accordingly in Mill's account of freedom.

After having defended passionately the freedom of thought and discussion and speculated about its absolute necessity for the sake of truth in the second chapter of his essay, Mill comes to discuss in the third chapter the free development of individuality and the freedom of action. He makes, then, the astonishing statement that '[n]o one pretends that action should be as free as opinions.' He goes on: 'On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.'²⁰ But 'what is "a positive instigation to some mischievous act"?', one may ask. Mill is very accurate on this as it is existentially important for his concept of freedom:

An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a

¹⁹ Cf. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 70-73.

²⁰ J.S. Mill, *ibid*, p. 123.

corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by active interference of mankind. The liberty of the must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinion into practice at his cost.²¹

We refrain from all those contradictions Mill gets necessarily involved when he tries artificially to draw an external boundary to the concept of freedom, which is set by the institution of private property. Accordingly, it is important to notice that Mill clearly states that when someone tries to put his/her ideas into practice, which attacks the institution of private property, then, this action deserves to be punished; because this action would attack capitalism at its very heart. This is, in turn, also the point where liberalism meets conservatism at last. As Honderich shows in his illuminating book *Conservatism* (which is more properly translated into German as *Das Elend des Konservatismus* which may be translated back into English as *The Poverty of Conservatism*), for conservatives freedom means always the freedom of acquiring and accumulating private property: 'If one thinks about freedom in relation to conservatism, one is in the first place reminded of *freedom to acquire and possess private property*.'²² There is however a difference between liberalism as represented by Mill and conservatism. Mill allows all sorts of actions as long as they do not touch the institution of private property, whereas conservatism allows only one form of freedom of action: to acquire and possess private property. But when liberalism evolves, it eventually accepts this conservative maxim as represented by Hayek, even though he claims he is not conservative.²³ This involves the radicalisation of Mill's limitations. This was done, if not much earlier, by Hayek and Berlin very forcefully, who enjoyed all sorts of institutional and financial support throughout the world.

Berlin's and Hayek's Radicalisation

We presented above Mill's account of freedom as a negative concept of freedom in length, because he is one of the most crucial figures and as such presents a turning point in the history of

²¹ J.S. Mill, *ibid*, p. 123-124.

²² T. Honderich, *Das Elend des Konservatismus*, p. 132 (Honderich's emphasis).

²³ F. A. Hayek, 'Why I Am Not a Conservative', in *Constitution of Liberty*, pp. 395-411.

European liberalism, and because he draws a kind of framework which served the basis for the subsequent generations of liberals (neo-liberals) and indeed conservatives for their further considerations on freedom. There are however two writers whose work determined almost the whole debate on freedom after the World War II. These are Isaiah Berlin and F. A. Hayek as we have indicated above. As we have presented Mill's account of freedom as a background and framework of contemporary liberal and neo-liberal writers we can keep the presentation of Berlin's and Hayek's accounts of freedom short by referring to what may perhaps be said new about their accounts in relation to Mill's.

Berlin's novelty in the history of liberal thought is his attempt to turn the original negative meaning of negative liberty into positive one by combining it with the principle of pluralism. Hayek's novelty lies in his most radical and explicit expression of the freedom of ruling classes in capitalist society that has been expressed before in its most radical way by T. R. Malthus.²⁴ Both Berlin and Hayek revise the whole tradition of liberal concept of freedom. In particular Locke's conception of freedom as self-mastery and power, which he formulates in the chapter on 'Power' in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*²⁵ is subject to this revision.

According to Berlin the answer to the question "What is the area within which the subject – a person or groups of persons [note that Berlin avoids using the concept of social class,-DG] – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other person?" refers to the negative sense of liberty, whereas the answer to the question "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"²⁶ points the positive sense of liberty. This of course deviates entirely from what classical liberalism used to understand what negative and positive liberty mean (we will come to this hereafter). Berlin formulates the difference between negative and positive liberty in this wilful way to conclude at the end of his essay: 'Pluralism, with the measure of "negative" liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goal of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the "positive" self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole mankind.'²⁷ The system of negative liberty in its social and political sense Berlin refers to is of course that of capitalist society with its representative government and the system of positive

²⁴ Probably to the surprise of many, contemporary liberals and neoliberals (and conservatives in any case) do everything at their disposal so that Malthusianism becomes a kind of official doctrine of the state. It is Domenico Losurdo's achievement to point that out: 'It is exactly the liberals who campaign for Malthusianism so that it can become a kind of official state doctrine, which should be taught as an unalterable truth and to which all, right from their very early age, have to accommodate.' (D. Losurdo, *Hegel und die Freiheit der Modernen*, p. 112.)

²⁵ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. and introduction by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 233-287.

²⁶ I. Berlin, „Two Concepts of Liberty“, in: *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press, Oxford et al., 1969, pp. 121-122. For a more current edition incorporating *Four Essays on Liberty* cf.: I. Berlin, *Liberty*, ed. H. Hardy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 168-169.

²⁷ Berlin, *ibid*, p. 171; Berlin, *ibid*, p. 216.

liberty (as an ‘humane ideal’) is that of socialist society as has been formulated in the *Manifest of Communist Party* by Marx and Engels.

Berlin’s claim implies that the system of negative liberty allows plurality, whereas that of positive liberty not. We think that this is not correct and needs to be further qualified to see that both negative and positive systems of liberty allow certain kinds of plurality. But let us first see what kind of plurality is it that is justified by Berlin as the ‘truer and more humane ideal’. As we have shown above when we presented Mill’s account of freedom we argued that his concept of liberty has the overall goal to defend private property and justify representative government as opposed to popular government. This is also what Berlin justifies and it admits a certain principle of pluralism within. As we know in capitalist society there are propertied classes and classes that are not propertied. The pluralism Berlin talks about is then the pluralism of social classes rather than plurality of liberties. As we know by now as shown above the talk of the plurality of liberties is nothing but a talk of the plurality of privileges. However, as Marx shows in *Capital* the freedom or accumulation of capital entails its domination of labouring classes as their products are permanently turned or rather assimilated into capital. From this point of view the system of negative liberty allows the freedom of capital, whereas the rest, that is, billions of people throughout the world, is dominated and their interests, wishes and projects are subordinated to the freedom of capital. This is what Berlin justifies as the ‘truer and more humane ideal’. To the kind of liberty that is aimed at in the system of positive liberty we will come further down.

Like Mill’s conception of freedom is drawn to defend private property and representative government and like Berlin’s essay is drafted to say that emancipation of the individual, subordinated classes and oppressed people is worst than living in capitalist pluralism (if we can speak in this connection of pluralism at all), Hayek’s conception of freedom is projected at the critique of the concept of freedom as power and redistribution of wealth. The combination of the concepts of freedom and power was explored by Locke as indicated above. However, in his critique of freedom as power Hayek does not mention Locke as the original source of the concept. Rather, he seems to prefer to attack American pragmatist writers. Without explicitly mentioning Locke but referring to J. R. Commons and John Dewey, Hayek asserts that ‘it is questionable whether the use of the word “liberty” in the sense of “power” should be tolerated.’²⁸ According to Locke it is impossible to think of freedom without power to action. From Hayek’s point of view however it is a confusion to combine liberty and power because it leads ‘to the identification of liberty with wealth’ and ‘this makes it possible to exploit all the appeal which the

²⁸ F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, p. 18.

word “liberty” carries in the support for a demand for the redistribution of wealth.²⁹ Accordingly further down he goes on and put forward why the wealth should not be redistributed.³⁰

Hayek is well known for his concept of freedom as ‘absence of coercion’. But what he means by absence of coercion is not what people seem usually to associate with this idea. What Hayek means by absence of coercion is in fact not absence of coercion at all, rather what he means by this is that coercion should be institutionally monopolised, say, by the state, for example, and regulated somehow. Hayek assesses coercion as follows:

Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the achievement of the ends of another. Free action, in which a person pursues his own aims by the means indicated by his own knowledge, must be based on data which cannot be shaped at the will by another.³¹

When Hayek talks about the elimination of the ‘individual’ if he/she is subject to coercion he seems to exclude those who live on the selling of their labour force, that is, who live on their wage labour, and those who are unemployed due to the mechanisms of capitalist production from possessing the qualities of individuality. Philosophers since Leibniz argue³² and as Marx showed convincingly that wage-labour is ‘forced labour’³³ and forced labour eliminates individuality on daily basis and those who are unemployed are being deprived of their human dignity as such. But Hayek’s conception of individuality is entirely blind to all those individuals

²⁹ Hayek, *ibid*, p. 17.

³⁰ Hayek, *ibid*, p. 306-323.

³¹ Hayek, *ibid*, p. 21.

³² Many ideas on forced labour as slavery, which are usually associated with Marx, have, however, a long tradition in German philosophy. (Cf. H.H. Holz, *Herr und Knecht bei Leibniz und Hegel*, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, Neuwied and Berlin, 1968). To the surprise of many, Leibniz is one of the first to theoretise on this. Unlike Locke, for example, who defines the result of his servant’s work as his property (J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 289), Leibniz says: ‘such a person is a slave from nature, who has to work, as another one prescribes...’ (G.W. Leibniz, ‘Die natürlichen Gesellschaften’, in: *Politische Schriften*, ed. and introduction by H.H. Holz, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., 1967, vol. 2, p. 138). He puts against the system of forced labour his conception of free labour. According to Leibniz if craftsman do not work because of hardship but free from hardship he/she would enjoy the work and do it with pleasure (Cf. G.W. Leibniz, ‘Sozietät und Wirtschaft’, in: *Politische Schriften*, ed. and introduction by H.H. Holz, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt a.M., 1967, vol. 2, p. 128).

³³ Nowadays the term ‘forced labour’ (Germ.: *Zwangsarbeit*, Fr.: *travaux forcés*) is used to describe the way how people were forced to work in concentration camps during German Fascism. This seems to be narrowing the meaning of the term. Marx and Engels use the term ‘forced labour’ in a particular sense to refer to that kind of labour people have to do if they are sentenced to do for punishment either by authorities or by their employers. However, beside this particular sense, Marx and Engels use the concept of labour in their very early Works as well as in later works like *Capital* in a more general sense to describe the way how people have to work in capitalist society as ‘forced labour’: Cf. for example K. Marx, *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, vol. 40, p. 514; F. Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1985, vol. 2, pp. 346-347; K. Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 23, pp. 328, 416, 562, 593, 601, 707.

from suppressed classes. This is, however, only one aspect of Hayek's the conception freedom. After having said that '[c]oercion is evil' and that it eliminates individuality Hayek goes on and claims that a 'free society' cannot be free unless it lives under permanent threat of coercion monopolised by the state. He never explains how a society can be called 'free' if it lives under perpetual threat of coercion. His argument goes as follows:

Coercion, however, cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state and by attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent coercion by private persons.³⁴

Here we have another example of how Hayek argues. He claims that coercion cannot be avoided altogether. He never explains why coercion cannot be avoided and how this relates to his general statement on freedom. However, when he comes to talk about how the monopolised coercion of the state may be limited (which is an illusion) he implicitly asserts that all individuals in the so-called free society are potential threat of coercion to one another. More importantly, when he claims that coercion cannot be avoided altogether, by this he in fact concedes that he is not developing a conception of liberty but putting ideas forward on how coercion may be regulated in a 'free' (read: capitalist) society by some sort of general rules.

Now, as we showed above Hayek was suggesting that 'while the uses of liberty are many, liberty is one' and that '[l]iberties appear only when liberty is lacking: they are the special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree.' When Hayek admits and if we follow him in this that in a 'free society' (this is how he calls capitalist society) all individuals are potential threat of coercion to one another he admits that in capitalist society (which he tries to justify by all means of ideological magic and acrobatics) there is no liberty but privileges. This, in turn, means that he is developing a conception of 'freedom' (read: coercion) to defend certain privileges which are not distributed among individuals in general as Hayek seems to imply but among individuals of ruling classes according to their properties, positions and status. This limitation to the concept of liberty leads logically to the limitation of the exploration of the concept of freedom merely as a negative concept. Hayek states explicitly that liberty is possible only in its negative sense. He says:

³⁴ Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, p. 21.

It is often objected that our concept of liberty is merely negative. This is true in the sense that peace is also a negative concept or that security or quiet or absence of any particular impediment or evil is negative. It is to this class of concepts that liberty belongs: it describes the absence of a particular obstacle-coercion by other men.³⁵

This is the high-point of Hayek's ideological acrobatics. As we know at latest since Seneca, the concept of peace is a positive concept rather than negative one. Similarly, security is a positive concept. His statement that 'absence of any particular impediment or evil is negative' needs further explanation which he does not provide. Let us take peace for example. Peace has a negative relation to war. But the situation of peace has a positive effect on society. But more importantly, when he admits that 'absence of any particular impediment or evil is negative' and states further that coercion (evil) cannot be avoided he in fact concedes that his concept of freedom does not aim at getting rid of the evil as such but he is wishing to keep it somehow under control to serve the interests of propertied classes.

As we will see immediately, Hayek's try to define freedom merely as a negative concept is not sanctioned by the history of ideas. The history of ideas is definitely looking for a dialectical unity of negative and positive liberty, and is very much concerned with the question of how negative liberty can be turned into positive one, quite understandable because negative liberty refers to external force and necessity. Therefore, we call this concept as explored in liberal tradition since Mill 'powerless' and take it as a sign of poverty of contemporary liberal (and indeed conservative) theorising about freedom.³⁶

MARX'S AND ENGELS' APPROACH TO THE CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AS HUMAN EMANCIPATION

After having presented above how liberal conception of freedom is evolved from a comprehensive conception in classical liberalism to a reductionist conception of negative (conservative) liberty after 1848/49 in neoliberalism, we are going to present in what follows below Marx's and Engels' conception of freedom as human emancipation. Here we are going to claim that the comprehensive approach of classical liberalism to the concept of freedom is preserved in Marx's and Engels' work, and the questions raised by classical liberal philosophers in this connection are reformulated in a qualitatively new context and answered in a qualitatively

³⁵ Hayek, *ibid*, p. 19.

³⁶ Cf. R.P. Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1968 (for a German edition cf. R.P. Wolff, *Das Elend des Liberalismus*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1969).

new light by Marx and Engels. But before doing that let us summarise that what has been said above.

In our methodological considerations above, by relying on Hayek and Marx at the same time we formulated a principle that may be applied to any theory of freedom, and any theory of freedom may be tested by it concerning the question of whether a theory of freedom is really a theory of freedom and, if yes, whether it is consistent and what kind of theory of freedom it may be. The principle formulated above suggests that freedom is a concept that occurs in any sphere of social life as a whole whether it is taken in relation to individuals or collective agents, whether it is taken in relation to private sphere or public sphere. This means that freedom is one of those social goods that cannot be separated for example like a natural object in infinite parts and distributed among members of a group or society. This means that in any sphere of social life freedom exists either as whole or it does not.

Proceeding from this principle we presented three major figures in the tradition of liberal theory after 1850. These are Mill from the 19th century, and Berlin and Hayek from the 20th century. We showed that from Mill up to Hayek in liberal or rather neoliberal theorising on freedom there prevails an increasing reductionist and dualist approach to freedom, which ends up in justification of what even Hayek -if he were consistent- would describe as a social situation in which there prevails 'special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree'. The reductionism and dualism stated above concerns the scope of the concept of freedom. Unlike the liberals and neoliberals, and conservatives after Mill, classical liberal theorising raised the questions concerning freedom in all sphere of social life: in relation to the freedom of speech, in regard to humanity's relationship to nature, in relation to social life in its narrow sense and concerning political liberties. Mill discards the ontological aspect of humanity's relationship to nature as it bears the potential question about how to emancipate humanity from capitalist yoke as will be shown hereafter. Berlin is however the first liberal writer to argue explicitly against the idea of human emancipation as has been shown above and Hayek is the first writer in this tradition to formulate a social and political theory which justifies total coercion and absence of freedom though he names it absence of coercion and free society. In short, the whole liberal or neoliberal writers since Mill eventually gave up the concept of positive liberty (so essential classical liberal philosophers) and justify negative liberty as the only form of liberty that is tolerable. Let us now turn to Marx and Engels and show how they explore the dialectical unity of negative and positive liberty and by this how they reply to the questions raised by classical liberal theorising about freedom.

In the climate of the cold war by using also deformations in socialist movements world-wide Marx's and Engels' theory has been often presented as the source of the most inhumane dictatorships throughout the world. However, this claim is not more than a fiction and lacks of any textual evidence. From their very early writings as we have quoted above up to their latest works like *Capital* and *Anti-Dühring* the theoretical questions of the concept of freedom and the practical problems of the emancipation of suppressed classes and the wretched and eventually of humanity remained their major concern. In their works we find the concept of freedom explored in relation to humanity's relation to nature and society, in regard to the relations of individuals to one another, in relation to politics and freedom of speech in our reality that is called capitalism. Therefore, we do not hold much of the claims that Marx changed in his later works his early humanist views and that there were major differences or even contradictions between Marx's and Engels' theorising. In what follows we quote both early writings and later works of Marx and Engels as making up the whole theory (which is from our point of view internally consistent) and we present Marx and Engels together as theoreticians of one and the same theory.

Critique of bourgeois notion of freedom

Unlike liberal/neoliberal and conservative writers, from his early writings on Marx refers to modern society not as a system of freedom but, though more advanced in relation feudal system of privileges, as a system of total domination, which reminds of Hobbesian realism combined with a Smithean-Hegelian historical approach. When Marx and Engels adopt classical liberalism's comprehensive view on freedom they do this not merely by taking it over. On the contrary, they adopt it critically from a historical point of view by adopting the view of working classes. In deed there is a tendency in classical European philosophy to that what have been presented above as reductionist and dualist view on freedom in contemporary liberalism.³⁷ In one way or another contractual tradition is supposed to justify negative liberty in any case. In the historical school there are many philosophers who, based on the amount of property one owns, do this too.³⁸ Therefore, it is understandable that Marx and Engels adopt the comprehensive view on freedom in classical liberalism from critical point of view. Two topics above all seem to have preoccupied Marx when he explored the concept of freedom: private property and freedom of trade, and how these relate to the concept of labour.

In his comments on *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* in his essay *Zur Judenfrage (Jewish Question)* the permanently occurring theme is private property and in relation to this he

³⁷ C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.

³⁸ See for example D. Hume, *Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*, in: *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. E.F. Miller, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1985, pp. 512-529.

investigates the question of what is meant by freedom. Commenting on the article 6 of the *Déclaration* Marx poses the question what is meant by freedom and comes to the conclusion: 'Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within which anyone can act *without harming* someone else are defined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post.' It is this form of freedom which turns human beings into isolated individuals or 'monads'. He continues: 'the right of man to liberty is based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the *right* of this separation, the right of the *restricted* individual, withdrawn into himself.' In this early essay Marx already aims at the critique of negative liberty. The freedom that is dealt with in the *Déclaration* is therefore acquiring and accumulating of private property. This is the point where he sets his critique. He says: 'The practical application of man's right to liberty is man's right to *private property*.'³⁹ In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights* Marx investigates, to the surprise of many, the reason why liberties appear and why this leads to the fact that liberty is lacking and, in turn, to the occurrence of 'special privileges and exemptions' – a fact which undermines any form of freedom and which Hayek asserts but never explores – least of all applies to contemporary society. Like Smith and Hegel, Marx relates the occurrence of special privileges to private property. He asserts in connection with the structure of the society in the Middle Ages:

It has often been said that in the Middle Ages every form of right, of freedom, of social existence, appears as a privilege, an exception from the rule. The empirical fact that all these privileges appear in the form of private property could thus not have been overlooked. What is the universal reason for this coincidence? Private property is the species-existence of privilege, of right as an exception.⁴⁰

That Marx talks about the genesis of privileges in the Middle Ages does not minimise the value of the quoted-passage for the issue in question. On the contrary, his historical observation about the relationship of the occurrence of privileges and private property can hardly be valued enough. As we showed above when Marx analyses the meaning of freedom in the *Déclaration* he is very much interested to see whether and how it is related to private property. From his observation about the structure of privileges in the Middle Ages it is not very difficult to make conclusions about the structure of privileges in modern society. If Marx's observation about close connection between the system of privileges and private property is valid, then, this means in fact that what Hayek justifies with his notion of freedom as regulated coercion is a system of privileges and this

³⁹ K. Marx, „Zur Judenfrage“, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 1, p. 364.

⁴⁰ Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 1, p. 314.

system of privileges is what Berlin calls pluralism of freedom. Both Berlin and Hayek, following Mill, sets out to justify this system of privileges under the name of freedom, which does not do any justice to the concept of liberty as explored in the classical period of European philosophy. But, on the contrary to liberals and conservatives, because of the system of privileges arising from the institution of private property, Marx refers to bourgeois society as an artificial community.

Let us now turn to how Marx deals with freedom of trade and how he relates this notion to the concept of freedom. We are going to point out a passage from the *Manifest of Communist Party*. But the idea is already present in Marx's above-quoted article on *Debates on the Freedom of Press*. In the *Manifest of Communist Party* Marx and Engels assert that 'in the contemporary bourgeois relations of production by freedom it is meant the freedom of trade, the free purchase and sell'⁴¹ of all sorts of commodities. By free trade, then, it is meant the freedom of owners of all sorts of commodities. Ironic enough the owners of the special commodity called 'labour force' are free to sell their labour force or to become unemployed with all its consequences. This observation of Marx and Engels can be read as a critique of both classical liberal and neoliberal (and conservative) notions of freedom. It is this form of freedom which turns human beings into isolated individuals or 'monads'. It separates each of us from others like a land mark between private fields. Because of this Marx refers to bourgeois society as an artificial community which becomes independent from individuals and moves against them and suppresses their freedom to (positive freedom). But it is also a society in which there are two major social classes fighting against one another. Therefore, according to Marx and Engels from subordinated classes' point of view capitalist society with its system of privileges is not only an illusionary community but also a fetter for their further development. In a real community however all individuals would obtain their freedom in and through their *free* association.⁴²

'Freedom is insight into the necessity':

Marx's and Engels' restatement and exploration of the ontological question

As we showed above, liberal theorising about freedom since Mill discards the comprehensive view of classical liberalism on freedom and reduces the issues concerning freedom to mere individualised constitutional issues. The ontological question which Mill excludes, but almost all philosophers of classical liberalism pay so much importance attention to the question of 'how is it possible for humanity to be free in the face of a physical ontology?' as we pointed out above. We

⁴¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1983, vol. 4, p. 476.

⁴² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1983, vol. 3, p. 74.

suggested above that this question bears necessarily the major question of how working classes and eventually humanity may be emancipated. While all subsequent generations of liberal and conservative writers followed Mill's reductionist and dualist path and radicalised it as we exemplified above by looking at Berlin's and Hayek's works in question, Marx and Engels took over the revolutionary legacy of classical liberalism and reformulated it from an entirely new perspective, that is to say from the view of the emancipation of working classes and eventually of humanity as such. In a passage from *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels observe:

'Hitherto freedom has been defined by philosophers in two ways: on the one hand, as power, as domination over the circumstances and relations in which an individual lives – by all materialists; on the other hand, as self-determination, being separated from the real world, as mere imaginary freedom of spirit – by all idealists, in particular by Germans.'⁴³

To Marx's and Engels' observation about how philosophers determined freedom one important aspect needs to be added. There is a third definition of freedom in the history of European philosophy, which is so crucial for Marx's and Engels' investigation into the nature paradoxes of freedom. It comes from Adam Smith. In his major works both *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, though not as clear as Marx and Engels, Smith nonetheless explores the concept of freedom not just as emancipation of individuals but also as emancipation of subordinated classes and humanity in general as collective agents. We will come back to this below. Marx's and Engels' reference to materialist philosophers may in particular be taken as a reference to philosophers like Locke and Hume. The idea that freedom is power and this should be understood in the sense of 'domination over the circumstances and relations in which an individual lives' was more or less explicitly formulated first by Locke and later restated and critically explored by Leibniz as a general idea. It culminates in Hegel's dialectical formulation that 'necessity is blind only insofar as it is not comprehended'.⁴⁴ It is therefore not wrong when Engels points to Hegel as the first philosopher to have presented the relationship between freedom and necessity correctly, if it is taken in this broad sense that Hegel's formulation is the culmination point of debates on and explorations of freedom since the European Reformation. Hegel's assertion (and it is an outcome of a long exploration and long

⁴³ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1983, vol. 3, p. 282 (for English edition cf. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 319).

⁴⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia: Logic* (Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze), translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1991, p. 222.

chain of arguments) on the relationship between necessity and freedom leads Engels to the formulation that ‘freedom is the insight into the necessity’.⁴⁵

Engels’ definition of freedom (and in *Capital* Marx defines freedom in the same way) may be taken both as a reply to liberal reductionist and dualist approach since Mill and at the same time it may be seen as an answer to a particular question raised by classical liberalism. As we have presented above what the reductionist and dualist approach is about, let us now turn to the question raised by classical liberalism. The question concerns the means by which not just individuals but also humanity can dominate over their natural and social circumstances so that all individuals can be free. Because of the reasons given above, the whole debate from Locke over Leibniz and Hume⁴⁶ to Kant can be summed up by saying that it was a debate about how to explore the relationship between freedom and necessity. It bears, of course, the main question of how freedom is possible in the face of physical ontology, that is to say that how freedom is possible when human beings live and produce under the domination of the law of nature. That was the main question raised by Hume’s treatment of the relationship of freedom and necessity. It is in this connection that Kant made his famous distinction between negative and positive freedom.⁴⁷ If the will, Kant argued, subject to natural necessity it can only be said to be free in its negative sense. However, Kant continues and asserts that from this negative freedom there arises the positive freedom. But Kant can hardly show convincingly how the positive freedom may arise from negative freedom as he, unlike the classical Scottish philosophers, does not exploit the concept of labour. In the last passage of his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (*Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals*) he concedes that we cannot grasp the categorical imperative which is the basis for freedom but we can comprehend that it is not comprehensible. Yet, he continues, even if we cannot comprehend it we can take it for granted that it is necessary to assume that the reason or the will is free.⁴⁸ Despite the fact that Kant explores a dualist approach concerning humanity’s relationship to nature and consequently takes for granted that the reason or the will is independent from nature (‘the principle of the autonomy of the pure will’⁴⁹), he points to the fact that in humanity’s relationship to nature there prevails the principle of necessity and the principle of freedom has to be placed beyond this relationship. But how and by means of what is this freedom possible?

⁴⁵ F. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Ummwälzung der Wissenschaft*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Berlin, 1986, vol. 20, p. 106.

⁴⁶ Cf. for example J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 237; G. W. Leibniz, *Neue Abhandlung über den menschlichen Verstand* (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1996), eds. and translation by W. von Engelhardt and H.H. Holz, vol. 1, pp. 263-265; D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 408.

⁴⁷ Cf. I. Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, in: *Werke*, ed. W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M, 1996, vol. 7, p. 81.

⁴⁸ I. Kant, *ibid*, p. 102.

⁴⁹ I. Kant, *ibid*, p. 90.

With his above-assertion Engels replies to this question which all liberal philosophers struggled with. After having made the above-assertion Engels continues:

Not in the independence of the laws of nature lays freedom, but in the cognition of these laws and in the herewith given possibility to let them act orderly for certain goals. This is valid both in relation to the laws of external nature and to those which regulates corporal as well as intellectual being of human beings – two classes of laws which we at most separate from one another in imagination but not in reality.⁵⁰

And with regard to the freedom of the will Engels asserts:

The freedom of the will means therefore nothing other than to be able to decide with expertise. The more *free* is the judgment of a human being in relation to a certain point of question, with greater *necessity* of the content of this judgment will be determined; while the insecurity footing on ignorance which apparently chooses arbitrarily between many different and contradicting possibilities of decision, proves exactly because of this its unfreedom, its domination by the object which it yet should dominate. Thus, freedom consists in the domination of ourselves and of external nature, which is based on the cognition of natural necessity; because of this it is necessarily a product of historical development.⁵¹

Engels' indication to the freedom of the will as a 'product of historical development' refers to two major concepts in Marxist theory. These are labour and praxis. The former is a particular concept, whereas the latter a more general one and includes the former one too.⁵² In his analyses of the concept of freedom in the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* Marx points out that the concepts of labour, private property and freedom are integral part of one another. Labour leads to private property and private property leads to freedom. This is a notion which has been employed to justify private property since Locke's famous statement in his *Second Treatise of Government*.⁵³ Marx's and Engels' approach to the concept of labour is much broader and, like Hume and Smith, they attach an ontological meaning to it. This broader approach enables Marx

⁵⁰ F. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Berlin, 1986, vol. 20, p. 106.

⁵¹ Engels, *ibid.*

⁵² We are aware of the complexity of both concepts and their mutual relation. What we present below is not more than a statement of the general idea. For an extensive exploration of Marx's conception of labour cf.: D. Göçmen, 'Über die Konzeption der Arbeit und ihre Bedeutung für die gegenwärtige Diskussion', in: Topos, eds. H. H. Holz and D. Losurdo, vol. 24(2005), pp. 89-121.

⁵³ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 289.

and Engels to grasp the reality in its totality both in its more general sense and in its historical or particular sense. After having come to the totalising view on freedom (freedom occurs in all spheres of social life as a whole) Marx searches for a starting-point from where the social reality can be presented in its totality, this is, both in its more general and historical or particular dimensions. The category Marx adopts to do this is labour. In *Capital* Marx describes labour as an activity to produce use-value and exchange-value. We will turn to labour as producing exchange-value and its relation to labour as producing use-value below. Use-value is an ontological concept and serves as the precondition of the basis for the existence of human beings independent of all social formations. It is absolutely necessary to organise the ‘metabolism’ between nature and society, that is, to ‘mediate human life’⁵⁴. Accordingly, Engels asserts that we are entitled to say in a certain sense that labour created human beings.⁵⁵

However, Marx and Engels describe the sphere of production as a sphere of necessity. In *Capital* Marx asserts that as the savages had to fight against nature to satisfy their needs to remain alive, produce and reproduce their lives so the civilised human beings. Freedom in the sphere of production can consist only in that that socialised human being, that is, associated producers can organise the production rationally and bring it under their common control, instead of being dominated by its blind powers as in capitalist society. In other words, the production can be organised in a way in accordance with the dignity of human nature so that humans need the minimum of their time and power to produce and reproduce their livelihood and enjoy the rest of their time to develop bodily, emotional and intellectual capacities. Nonetheless the sphere of production remains ‘always a kingdom of necessity.’⁵⁶ However, labour and production is not just subject to necessity. On the contrary, it is also the source of freedom. Marx says:

‘Indeed the kingdom of freedom begins first there where labour, which is determined by hardship and external adequacy of purpose, stops; as a matter of fact it lies beyond the actual sphere of material production.’⁵⁷

The sphere beyond the sphere of production is the sphere where the development of human power begins. In this sphere, that is, in the sphere of ‘real kingdom of freedom’ humanity is of its own immediate goal. This sphere of freedom, however, can arise only on the basis of the kingdom of necessity. The basis of the historical development of society is the extension of the

⁵⁴ K. Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 1, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1988, vol. 23, p. 57.

⁵⁵ F. Engels, *Dialektik der Natur*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1986, vol. 20, p. 444.

⁵⁶ K. Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 1, p. 57.

⁵⁷ K. Marx, *ibid.*

appropriation of nature by labour. This development leads necessarily to the extension of the kingdom of necessity, because it extends and enriches the needs.⁵⁸ But as this development entails also the development of productive forces of humanity it entails at least potentially also the possibility of the extending of the sphere of freedom.⁵⁹ For this the shortening of working-hours is foundational precondition and absolutely necessary and under normal circumstances, that is to say that if labour is emancipated from its commodified form and reorganised as an activity to meet needs, the increase of the productivity of labour may enable human beings to do this.⁶⁰

Labour, capital and liberty

In the section above we presented Marx's and Engels' general theory of labour as producing use-value and worked out how it relates to humanity's freedom in its relation to nature. Now we turn to their analysis of the situation of labour in capitalist society and will show briefly how it relates to the concept of freedom. Because of the above-described ontological importance of labour and its centrality to the concept of freedom Marx and Engels are above all concerned with the situation and the conditions of labour in the historically given society, that is, in capitalism, as an activity producing beside use-value also exchange-value. In the first chapter of *Capital* of volume one, Marx analyses the contradictory relation of use-value and exchange-value and shows that in capitalist society the ontological aspect of labour, that is, the use-value producing labour is oppressed. This is the basis of the subordination of working classes under the domination of capital. In volume 3 of *Capital* quoting Engels' early work *The Conditions of the Working Class in England* Marx refers to the work conditions in capitalist society as a 'modern form of slavery'. Labour in its commodified form, that is, wage labour as producing exchange-value is a 'forced labour'. According to Marx and Engels, bourgeoisie keeps fettered proletariat in slavery and this despotic domination of bourgeoisie may be best observed in the system of factory. In the system of factory the bourgeoisie determines all aspects of the life of the proletariat – an issue which Hayek does not discuss at all. Therefore, Engels says that 'in the system of factory all freedom ceases to exist judicially and practically.'⁶¹ According to Marx and Engels the emancipation of labour from the domination of capital is prerequisite for the establishment of liberty as a social system.

⁵⁸ K. Marx, *Das Kapital Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 3, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1975, vol. 25, p. 828.

⁵⁹ This is the point Kant could come to term with as he (unlike almost all other philosophers of European Enlightenment such Adam Smith and Hegel, for example) does not refer to the concept of labour, which unavoidably leads him to adopt a dualist approach.

⁶⁰ K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. 3, p. 828.

⁶¹ F. Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, p. 398.

Now, there are two remarks to be made in relation to this assertion of Engels from current debates' point of view. First, over the last three decades and more there have been lot of discussions on new forms of the organisation of production. New terms like 'lien production' or 'Toyotism' have been invented to claim that freedom of labour was possible without changing property relations concerning the means of production. We think despite all changes over the last 150 years or so there is no need to question Engels' observation on the logic of capitalist production as current figures about unemployment show. Second, when we refer here to Engels' description of the logic of production in the system of factory, this should not be taken in a reductionist sense. Rather, we think that the nature of all other forms of social praxis may be grasped in the light of modern work conditions. Therefore, today any serious investigation into the concept of freedom from Marx's and Engels' point of view must start with the analysis and the critique of modern working conditions and proceed from there to show how labour might be emancipated. The emancipation of labour from its commodity form is the precondition for the emancipation of humanity as such.

Now, compared to what liberal and neoliberal writers do, one may claim that Marx and Engels also explore a concept of privileges. This claim would indeed be justified if it is put forward. However, there is an important difference. The difference between liberal and neoliberal writers, on the one side, and Marx and Engels, on the other side, is this: while the former justify the privileges of ruling classes, Marx and Engels defend from a historical point of view the privileges of oppressed social classes. More importantly: in Marx's and Engels' exploration of the concept of freedom as privileges of working classes there is the perspective on the human emancipation as such. In liberal and neoliberal writers' exploration of liberty as a concept of the privileges of ruling classes this perspective on human emancipation is lacking. The system of privileges of ruling classes, which liberal and neoliberal writers wish to defend, is supposed to be a permanent situation, whereas the system of privileges of working classes, which Marx and Engels justify, is supposed to be a temporary situation and it leads and it must lead to the emancipation of humanity as such. This is the point where humanity can enter free civilisation of the free association of all individuals in its truest sense:

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the *public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another.* If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept

away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.⁶²

In conclusion: this comparative study shows that today's theory of liberty or freedom is Marxism. It is this perspective of permanent emancipation of humanity, which makes Marxism to the theory of freedom today. To show why and how we come to this conclusion, this essay is organised around four main theses. *First*, by relying on Hayek and Marx it shows that freedom is one of those social goods, which does not admit a division in infinite parts like natural objects for example. It occurs, therefore, in all spheres of social life as a whole. In other words, if one speaks of freedom of speech, for example, he/she means by this that it is not just about the free expression of thought, but it is at the same time a particular form of the expression of human freedom as such. It claims, *secondly*, liberal (and conservative) writers on liberty since mid of 19th century gave up gradually this totalising view on freedom. Since then they explore merely a concept of freedom that is not more than a concept of negative liberty. This shows, it is further claimed, that the system of liberty which neoliberal writers put forward is in fact nothing but a concept of coercion and a system of privileges for dominating (propertied) classes. However, *third*, the totalising view on freedom and the dialectical approach to the relationship of positive and negative freedom was what classical liberalism tried to establish. The *fourth* main thesis of the paper consequently is that this totalising view on liberty is reformulated by Marx and Engels from working classes' point of view in an entirely new light, in the sense that they reformulated the concept of freedom as human emancipation. Therefore, this is how we would like to conclude, it seems to be justified to conclude that if one takes the concept of freedom really seriously and wants to see it truly realised that really breaks with any form of hair splitting legal formalism he/she has to seek advice from Marx's and Engels' works.

⁶² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei*, in: *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1983, vol. 4, p. 482 (italics added).

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